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Abstract:   
This paper assesses the impact that a widely-based Securities Transaction Tax (STT) 
could have on the likelihood of systemic financial crises. We apply the methodology 
developed by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) [IMF Staff Papers 45 (1)] to a 
panel dataset of 34 OECD countries for the sample 1973 – 2012, using a measure of a 
country’s average bid-ask spread in financial markets as a proxy for the likely effect of a 
STT on transactions costs. Our results indicate that the establishment of a STT could 
sizeably increase the risk of financial crises. 
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1 Introduction
The global environment for regulating financial markets and institutions is undergoing
important changes. Motivated by the severe worldwide crisis of 2008-2009, these changes
aim to make financial markets more resilient and lessen the likelihood of systemic crises
occurring in the future.1
In this context, the establishment of a Securities Transaction Tax (STT), an ad-valorem
tax on many financial transactions, has generated renewed interest. An ongoing policy
effort initiated by the European Commission aims to introduce such a tax across the
European Union and has two stated goals: increase the resilience of European financial
markets and generate revenue that could help share the burden of future support to
troubled financial institutions. Assessing the likely impact of a EU-wide STT is challenging
however, because no widely-based such tax presently exist; in turn, this uncertainty has
slowed down the implementation process of the EU STT considerably.2
To contribute to this debate, the present paper assesses the likely impact of a STT on
the likelihood of systemic financial crises, using the methodology in Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and
Detragiache (1998). A binary financial crisis variable is constructed and a logit model
for determining the probability of crisis is formulated. The model is estimated using a
panel dataset for the 34 OECD countries covering the sample 1973 − 2012. We develop
a measure of the average bid-ask spread in a country’s financial markets and use it as a
proxy for the likely impact of a STT on transaction costs and we include this proxy to the
model’s explanatory variables.
Our results uncover a positive, statistically as well as economically significant rela-
tionship between our proxy for the STT and the likelihood of crisis; said otherwise, high
transactions costs are associated with higher risks of financial crises. Our benchmark spec-
ification reports that the odds of experiencing a crisis doubles following a unit-increase in
the proxy and our sensitivity analysis shows that this effect may be as large as a five-fold
increase in those odds. These results therefore suggest that the implementation of a EU-
wide STT could increase the likelihood of financial crisis and are distinctly at variance
with the effect envisaged by the EU proposal.
Previous work analyzing the economic impacts of STTs has tended to concentrate on
aspects of financial markets performance conceptually different than the occurrence of
crises, such as market volatility or trading volumes (Jackson and O’Donnell, 1985; Roll,
1989; Umlauf, 1993; Saporta and Kan, 1997; Pomeranets and Weaver, 2011). In addition,
this literature has often focused on specific countries and/or historical episodes. The
1Regulatory changes under consideration or already enacted include increased capital requirements for
banks, tighter limits on loan-to-value ratios, as well as new “macroprudential” policies.
2Initially expected by 1 January 2014, the EU STT continues to be debated and controversies over its
scope and practical implementation details remain.
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present paper adopts a complementary strategy and examines a large panel of countries
over a constant historical sample, in order to filter out country or time-specific factors and
help establish the likely impact of an area-wide tax like the EU STT.
Our panel-data approach is also related to an important body of work analyzing the
key determinants of banking, exchange rate, or financial crisis: in addition to Demirgu¨c¸-
Kunt and Detragiache (1998), this literature includes work by Kaminsky and Reinhart
(1999), Borio and Lowe (2002), Bussiere and Fratzscher (2006), Davis and Karim (2008)
and Schularick and Taylor (2012). In contrast to this literature, however, the present
paper focuses on Securities Transaction Taxes and their likely macrofinancial effects.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a short discus-
sion of the literature on securities transactions taxes and the manner in which they might
affect volatility and resilience in financial markets. Section 3 then presents the econometric
model, while section 4 describes the data, providing details on how we construct the crisis
variable and the proxy for the impact of STTs on transaction costs. Section 5 presents
our results and discusses their significance, while section 6 concludes.
2 Securities Transactions Taxes
Establishing an ad-valorem tax on some or all financial transactions was originally pro-
posed by Keynes to reduce what he considered excess volatility and disruptive speculation
in financial markets. The likely macroeconomic and financial impacts of this type of tax
has been the subject of a lively academic literature ever since.3
Proponents of STTs (Tobin, 1978; Stiglitz, 1989; Summers and Summers, 1989) have
argued that these taxes can stabilize financial markets and increase their resilience because
they penalize trades that reflect non-informed views or short-term (speculative) investing
horizons. More skeptical views are advanced by Kupiec (1996) and Amihud and Mendelson
(2003), among others, who remark that a STT also discourages trades by informed traders,
which can have stabilizing influences on financial markets by providing the liquidity that
allows non-informed trading and limits its impact on prices.4
Empirical studies on the impacts of STTs have also obtained mixed results. Most
notably, difference-in-difference econometric approaches have been developed to contrast
the behavior of stocks traded on an exchange subject to a STT (or a proxy therein) with
the behavior of comparable stocks trading on another exchange where the tax does not
apply. Some of these studies (Umlauf, 1993; Jones and Seguin, 1997; Pomeranets and
Weaver, 2011) report that STTs have adverse effects on markets, increasing volatility or
3See Pomeranets (2012) for a review of this literature.
4Kupiec (1996) interprets a STT as acting on “...the symptom of market dysfunction–excess trading
volume–” while doing nothing “...to alleviate the cause of the excess volatility–the noise trader’s expecta-
tional difference of opinion”.
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lowering liquidity; others, by contrast, report no significant deleterious effects on financial
markets from the imposition of STTs (Saporta and Kan, 1997; Becchetti et al., 2013;
Capelle-Blancard and Havrykchyk, 2014).
Although the potential of STTs for reducing the likelihood of systemic crises has always
been at the forefront of policy discussions, empirical examinations of this type of tax has
often concentrated on financial outcomes (like liquidity, or within-period volatility) that
are only indirectly liked to crises. This paper aims to complement the extent literature by
explicitly considering if STTs impact the likelihood of systemic crises.
3 Methodology
To assess the potential link between a STT and the probability of financial crises, we adopt
the approach developed by Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache (1998). In this context, denote
Yit the binary variable indicating whether country i at time t experiences a crisis (Yit = 1)
or not (Yit = 0). A logistic approach is used whereby
Prob(Yit = 1) = F (β
′Xit) =
eβ
′Xit
1 + eβ′Xit
, (1)
where Xit is a (k · 1) vector of explanatory variables for country i at time t, and β is
the (k · 1) vector of associated coefficients. Parameters of the model are estimated by
maximizing the sample likelihood
LogL =
∑
i
∑
t
[
YitlogF (β
′Xit) + (1− Yit)log(1 − F (β
′Xit))
]
. (2)
In the data described below, financial crises are rare and some countries (Canada,
for example) are found not to have experienced any crisis during the historical period
reflected in our sample (1973− 2012). In such a case, the logit function for F (·) precludes
the addition of (country) fixed effects to the model because one variable (the fixed effect)
could be sufficient to perfectly predict the dependent variable for the countries with no
crisis (Greene, 2012). We therefore abstain from including fixed-effects and pool all data.5
Recall that in the logistic model (1), the sign of a parameter correctly indicates the
direction of the probability change but its magnitude is not the marginal impact, which
is a non-linear function of all explanatory variables. As a result, the impact of a change
in a given explanatory variable is not be the same across countries and periods in our
sample: rather, it is smallest in country-period pairs with very low or very high initial
crisis probability and highest for intermediate initial probabilities.
5Alternatively, a probit model with random effects would require assuming that random effects are
uncorrelated with regressors. See Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) for a discussion.
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In this context, a useful gauge of an estimate’s economic significance is the change
in the odds ratio, which we denote ∆OR, that measures how much a unit-change in a
given explanatory variable modifies the odds of observing a crisis. It obtains that for any
explanatory variable k,
∆OR = eβk =
Prob(Yit = 1|Xitk + 1)
Prob(Yit = 0|Xitk + 1)
/
Prob(Yit = 1|Xitk)
Prob(Yit = 0|Xitk)
. (3)
Below, we discuss the economic significance of our results by referring to ∆OR.
Once a crisis occurs in a country, it very likely produces an endogenous response of
its economy and could introduce an inverse causality loop between our dependent and
explanatory variables. To limit the extent of this problem, we follow Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt
and Detragiache (1998) and report results based on two samples. This first excludes all
observations from one country after the onset of the first crisis affecting that country. The
disadvantage of this strategy is that it eliminates data and does not allow the model to
incorporate multiple crises episodes that may have affected some countries. Our second
sample therefore deletes only country observations occurring during the period of the
crisis and starts recording data once it has abated: if a crisis occurs from 2008 to 2009,
say, observations for those years are not included but those prior to 2007 and from 2010
onwards are.
4 Data
Our dataset covers the 34 OECD countries over the period 1973 − 2012 and the data
are annual.6 The dependant variable – the occurrence of a financial crisis– is binary and
takes value 1 if a crisis is experienced and 0 otherwise. Explanatory variables are from the
financial and macroeconomic realm and are similar to those used in the related literature.
We construct a proxy for the likely impact of a STT on transaction costs by using annual
averages of bid-ask spreads in the financial markets of all the countries in our sample.
4.1 Dependent Variable
One influential definition for what constitutes a financial crisis characterizes it as a pro-
found disruption of financial markets whose symptoms include sharp declines in assets price
and the failure of many financial and non financial firms (Eichengreen and Portes, 1987).
To operationalize this definition, we use historical data on banking crises constructed by
6Restricting the analysis to OECD countries, a group of relatively homogenous and advanced countries,
is an appropriate strategy when discussing the EU STT tax, which would similarly be applied to a group
of relatively homogenous countries.
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Laeven and Valencia (2012) and data on stock market indexes from Datastream. Specif-
ically, we code the presence of a financial crisis when a banking crisis occurs according
to Laeven and Valencia (2012) and when stock markets in the country decline by a pre-
determined threshold (we experiment with declines of 20%, 25%, and 50%). Considering
that a STT would arguable affect asset markets more than the banking sector, we consider
it important to use a crisis definition that records dysfunctional behavior in both sectors.
This definition requires that both the banking sector and asset markets experience
challenging conditions before a financial crisis is considered to be occurring. As a result,
financial crises are relatively rare events in the OECD data. Table 1 provides some descrip-
tive statistics, and shows that some countries (e.g. Canada) are not considered to have
experienced a financial crisis in the 1973− 2012 period, whereas countries like the United
States are considered to have experienced very few. In total, 28 crisis events are recorded
for the 34 OECD countries when the threshold decline in assets prices is 20%, and only
15 crisis when a decline of 50% in asset prices is used to define a crisis. To further assess
the sensitivity of our results, we also estimate our model using only the banking crisis
indicators from Laeven and Valencia (2012) (38 crisis events are then recorded); this last
case compares directly to those in the literature (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998;
Borio and Lowe, 2002; Davis and Karim, 2008). Importantly, results in Section 4 show
that our key result – the positive association between our STT proxy and the likelihood
of crisis– is robust to the changes in the measurement of crises.
4.2 Explanatory Variables
STT index
Since no homogenous STT currently applies to a large group of countries, a proxy for
its effect needs to be developed for the analysis to proceed. One likely practical effect of
establishing the EURO-STT would be to raise the gap between prices paid by buyers and
those received by sellers of financial assets. We therefore analyze the possible impact of
a STT on the probability of crisis by using a proxy constructed from transactions cost.
To this end, we use the reported bid-ask spreads on the thirty biggest companies of every
country in our sample to construct an annual transactions costs index.7
Specifically, our STT proxy for country i at time t is constructed as
STTit =
∑
j
Djit
Dit
(
PAjit − PBjit
PBjit
), (4)
where PAjit and PBjit are the Ask and Bid prices for firm j of country i in year t, and
Dijt is the firm’s capitalization; Dit is the aggregate market capitalization for all firms
7We use market capitalization to identify the thirty biggest companies in each country and companies
are added or deleted from the index as their market capitalization evolves through time.
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considered of country i in year t. Since Bid-Ask spreads –the market maker’s margin
on each effective transaction– may include costs related to adverse selection in addition
to pure transactions costs, using large firms only in constructing the index is meant to
emphasize the presence of the latter in our proxy.8
Over the complete sample, average computed transactions costs stand at 1.7%, with
a (within-country but across time) average of 2.4%. Considerable heterogeneity exists
however: the average figures for the United States and Canada are relatively low (0.2%)
while corresponding figures for countries like Sweden and Denmark are high.
Other Explanatory Variables
We follow the literature on the prediction of crisis and consider additional explanatory
variables from the macroeconomic and financial realms. First, macroeconomic variables
are represented by GDP growth, the inflation rate, and a measure of short-term interest
rates, because these variables have been associated to the occurrence of crisis by previous
literature. (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Davis and Karim, 2008).9
Other explanatory variables are linked to the strength and the depth of a country’s
banking, credit, and asset markets. On the banking side, we include the ratios of private
bank credit, of total bank deposits, and of liquid bank assets to the country’s GDP, as well
as the net interest margin and operating costs as a ratio of the banking sector’s income.
From stock markets, we include Total Stock Market Capitalization and Total Value
Traded (both relative to the country’s GDP) as well as turnover, transaction volumes as
well as intra-period volatility.10
5 Results
Table 3 to 5 present our results. Each table reports our estimate of (2) for two samples and
several specifications. As described above, the first sample is constructed by excluding all
data from a country once it has been affected by a first crisis, in order to limit potential
endogeneity problems; the second sample reflects a less conservative approach that deletes
8Glosten and Harris (1988) list inventory and adverse selection costs as the two main components of Bid-
Ask spreads, the latter component being larger for firms or stock markets where informational asymmetries
are severe. Indices of transactions costs are also analyzed by Stoll and Whaley (1983) and Schultz (1983).
9See Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) for an intuitive discussion of the links between these
variables and the likelihood of crises. The authors include other macroeconomic variables linked to de-
velopments in exchange rates, terms-of-trade, and fiscal positions but do not find these variables have
statistically significant impacts on the probability of crises.
10Intra-period volatility refers to the standard deviation of the monthly stock index within a year and
is therefore conceptually different from the annual change in the stock index level, one of the component
in the financial crisis definition.
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data only during the years a country is experiencing the crisis and reintroduces the country
in the sample once the crisis is over. The six specifications analyzed per sample incorporate
the explanatory variables one block at the time (columns (1) to (3)) or simultaneously
(columns (4) to (6)). Finally, Table 3, 4, and 5 reflect different measures of the crisis
variable: Table 3 illustrates our benchmark measure, wherein a crisis is defined by the
presence of a systemic banking crisis and of a general decline of 50% in asset prices; Table
4 adopts an intermediary position for which a decline of 20% in asset prices is sufficient
to define a crisis; Table 5 reports the consequence of abstracting from asset price declines
altogether and keeping only the systemic banking crisis criterion to define financial crises.
In each table, model performance is assessed using four criteria, listed at the bottom
of each column. First, “Deviance explained” is a R2-equivalent goodness-of-fit measure
assessing the value-added of the model in explaining crises, relative to a specification in
which only a constant included. The next three measures, –the “Success”, “Accuracy”
and “Sensibility” rates– report the model’s performance in correctly classifying events. To
construct them, for each country-period pair, we consider the model’s in-sample prediction
to be Ŷit = 1 (a crisis event) if F (β̂
′Xit) ≥ 0.5 and Ŷit = 0 (a non-crisis event) if F (β̂
′Xit) <
0.5. Using this prediction, the “Success Rate” is the fraction of times the model correctly
predicts realized events (be they crisis or no-crisis events), the “Accuracy” rate is the
fraction of times the model was correct in predicting a crisis and the “Sensibility” rate is
the proportion of realized crises correctly predicted by the model; these latter two measures
differ from each other in that “Accuracy” controls for type-II errors while “Sensibility”
encompasses errors of type-I.
The key takeaways from Table 3-5 concern the impact of our STT proxy on the like-
lihood of crises. The estimated coefficients for the STT proxy are positive and generally
statistically significant, indicating that a rise in the proxy is associated with a higher
risk of financial crisis. These results suggests that the EU-STT could reduce resilience
in European financial markets and increase their vulnerability, an outcome at variance
with the one of the original intent of the policy. This surprising effect is also economically
meaningful: the ∆OR (second line of each Table) measure indicates that a one standard
deviation in the STT proxy increases the odds of experiencing a financial crises by up to
fives times (column 5 of Table 3).
Importantly, Tables 3-5 illustrate that our estimates of the importance of STTs are
largely robust to how the crisis data is constructed: recall that whereas the left-hand
side of each table reflects the case when all data following the first incidence of a crisis
are discarded, right-hand sides of the tables refer to the cases for which data from that
country is reintroduced in the sample once the crisis is over. Across the two cases, the STT
index remains statistically significant and economically meaningful in most specifications,
although model performance does decrease somewhat, with the R2-like goodness-of-fit
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measure noticeably smaller for the second (right-hand-side) samples.
In addition, the tables show that results remain also robust when alternative definitions
for a crisis are considered, with Table 4 reporting the case where a 20% decline in assets
prices is sufficient to code the presence of a crisis and Table 5 pertaining to the case
where only banking crisis are used. Overall therefore, the STT index remains positively
associated to the likelihood of crisis and remains statistically and economically meaningful
in most cases.11
Tables 3-5 also report that other macroeconomic and financial control variables impor-
tantly affect the probability of crisis. Among them, GDP growth is estimated to reduce
the probability of crisis in a sizeable and statistically significant fashion, a result that is
present in previous contributions to the literature on crisis prediction (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt
and Detragiache, 1998; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Davis and Karim, 2008). Similarly,
high real interest rates are also associated with an increased vulnerability to crises. Inter-
estingly, the rate of inflation is not robustly significant, in contrast to Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and
Detragiache (1998). This might be related to the fact that our dataset covers the relatively
homogenous countries forming the OECD and inflation was well-anchored in most such
countries during a large proportion of the years covered by our sample.12
Estimates for the banking variables most often exhibit the signs predicted by the lit-
erature. For instance, higher rates of bank credit to GDP raise the likelihood of financial
crisis, in line with the literature interpreting crises as being cause by credit booms (Schular-
ick and Taylor, 2012; Borio and Lowe, 2009). Higher bank costs also worsens the resilience
of financial markets. However, these estimates most often lack the statistical significance
exhibited by the macroeconomic variables discussed above. This might stem from our
definition of financial crisis, which requires both banking and asset markets to experience
challenging conditions before a crisis is coded. Lessening the importance of asset markets
in that definition definition (as reflected in results from Tables 4 and 5) leads to more
significant estimates.
Contrasting with the banking variables estimates, those arising from stock markets are
often highly significant. Market capitalization decreases the probability of crisis whereas
large values of transactions increase that likelihood. Intra-period price volatility is the most
significant variable and its positive association with systemic crisis confirms theoretical and
empirical work that focuses on a strong relation between higher volatility and financial
turmoil (Umlauf, 1993; Jones and Seguin, 1997; Pomeranets and Weaver, 2011).
11Other specifications tests having been performed include the exclusion of outlier countries from the
sample and the inclusion of lagged variables. Our key results remain robust to these sensitivity tests as
well. Full results are available from the authors.
12Using data from relatively developed countries similar to ours, Schularick and Taylor (2012) also fail
to statistically associate inflation to financial crises.
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6 Conclusion
Proponents of the EU securities transactions tax (STT) have argued that it has the poten-
tial to discourage uninformed and disruptive trading and reduce the likelihood of financial
crises. Using a logistic approach and a panel dataset covering the period 1973 − 2012
for the 34 OECD countries, we show that a proxy for the likely impact of an STT on
transactions costs is positively associated with the occurrence of crisis, suggesting that
such a tax could increase, rather than decrease, the risk of financial crisis. This effect is
present in several empirical specifications analyzed and is economically meaningful. This
result might be interpreted in the context of contributions by Kupiec (1996) and Amihud
and Mendelson (2003) who argue that STTs, by discouraging informed trading, may have
adverse effects on liquidity, volatility and the resilience of financial markets.
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Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics for the variable “Financial Crises”
Number of Financial Crises when Defined with Decline in Asset Prices of:
Period 20% 25% 50%
USA Canada OECD USA Canada OECD USA Canada OECD
1973 − 1980 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1981 − 1990 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0
1991 − 2000 0 0 7 0 0 6 0 0 3
2001 − 2011 1 0 19 1 0 19 0 0 12
Total 1 0 28 1 0 26 0 0 15
Source: Author’s calculations
Table 2 – Definition and source of variables
Variable Definition Source
Dependent Variables
Banking Crisis Significant banking system distresses IMF
Asset prices declines Annual stock market indexes variations Datastream
Securities Transactions Tax
STT Index Weighted Average of bid-ask spreads Datastream
Macroeconomic Variables
GDP Growth Real GDP growth rate OECD
Inflation Consumer Price Index growth rate OECD
Real Interest Rate Real 3-Month Treasury Bill Rate OECD
Banking Variables
Private Credit Credit to private sector as a ratio of GDP OECD
Total deposits Deposits in banks relative to GDP OECD
Liquid Assets Bank Cash and Liquid Securities to GDP OECD
Net Interest Bank Margin Rate OECD
Bank Costs Bank Costs as a Ratio of Sector’s Income OECD
Stock Market Variables
Capitalization Stock market Capitalization to GDP Datastream
Value Traded Value of Stock Market Transactions to GDP OECD
Stock Turnover Value of Transactions as a Ratio of Capitalization OECD
Price Volatility Within-Year Standard Deviation of Stock Prices Datastream
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Table 3 – Estimation Results: Benchmark Measure of Financial Crisis
Sample 1 Sample 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Transactions Costs
STT Index 0.4 *** 0.5 ** 0.4 *** 0.4 ** 0.5 * 0.4 * 0.2 1.6 ** 0.2 0.2 1.6 ** 1.0 *
∆OR 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.2 5.0 1.2 1.2 5.0 2.7
Macroeconomic Variables
GDP Growth -0.9 *** — — -0.5 -1.0 ** -0.2 -0.6 * — — -0.2 -0.8 * -0.1
Inflation -0.8 — — -4.3 3.0 1.5 0.7 — — -0.9 4.3 3.9
Real Interest Rate 1.6 — — 0.8 7.8 * -0.6 4.0 — — 5.4 8.6 * 3.2
Banking Variables
Private Credit — 0.3 — — 0.2 1.1 — 0.3 — — 0.0 0.5
Total deposits — -3.7 — — -4.0 — — -4.2 — — -4.7 —
Liquid Assets — 3.1 — — 3.5 1.2 — 3.5 — — 4.2 0.6
Net Interest — -0.1 — — -0.3 — — -0.2 — — -0.7 —
Bank Costs — 0.0 — — -0.0 — — 0.1 — — -0.1 —
Stock Markets
Capitalization — — -2.3 ** -1.0 — -4.1 ** — — -2.1 ** -0.7 — -1.8
Value Traded — — 1.9 * — — 2.3 — — 1.8 ** — — 1.2
Stock Turnover — — -1.1 0.4 — -1.9 — — -1.1 0.5 — -0.9
Price Volatility — — 0.7 *** 0.7 *** — 0.8 *** — — 0.6 *** 0.7 *** — 0.7 ***
Dev. Expl. (%)∗ 15.3 13.2 41.5 39.7 25.9 48.2 7.3 12.3 32.0 29.6 22.5 36.3
Success Rate† 97.1 96.6 97.3 96.9 96.6 97.4 97.3 97.1 97.7 97.0 97.1 97.4
Accuracy‡ 100 100 66.7 60.0 100 75.0 0.0 100 75.0 50.0 100 66.7
Sensibility§ 11.1 14.3 44.4 33.3 14.3 37.5 0.0 14.3 33.3 11.1 14.3 25.0
Notes: Maximum likelihood estimates of equation (2). Symbols ∗,∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance of a parameter at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
∆OR is the change in the odds ratio resulting from a one-unit change in STT .
∗ “Deviance Explained” Goodness of Fit Criterion.
† Fraction of events (No Crisis or Crisis) correctly predicted by the model.
‡ Fraction crisis predictions that were realized.
§ Fraction of realized crises correctly predicted by the model.
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Table 4 – Estimation Results: Alternative Measure of Financial Crisis
Sample 1 Sample 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Transactions Costs
STT Index 0.3 0.3 0.4 ** 0.5 ** 0.9 0.5 0.1 1.1 0.1 0.1 0.8 1.0 *
∆OR 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.6 2.5 1.6 1.1 3.0 1.1 1.1 2.2 2.7
Macroeconomic Variables
GDP Growth -2.2 *** — — -2.2 *** -4.1 *** -1.8 *** -0.7 ** — — -0.6 -0.8 ** -0.3
Inflation -2.8 — — 6.6 5.2 9.4 0.9 — — 1.8 5.0 4.4
Real Interest Rate 1.3 — — 14.3 * 4.4 15.8 * 4.5 * — — 9.0 ** 8.6 ** 9.2 **
Banking Variables
Private Credit — 0.7 * — — 0.2 0.3 — 0.4 — — 0.3 0.2
Total deposits — 0.3 — — 0.4 — — 1.7 — — 1.7 —
Liquid Asstes — -0.1 — — 0.1 1.6 * — -1.6 — — -1.5 0.9 **
Net Interest — 0.8 — — 1.3 — — 0.2 — — -0.3 —
Bank Costs — 0.8 ** — — 1.1 ** — — 0.6 *** — — 0.6 *** —
Stock Markets
Capitalization — — -1.2 -0.2 — -2.4 — — -0.6 0.3 — -0.8
Value Traded — — 1.2 — — 2.0 — — 0.9 — — 0.9
Stock Turnover — — -0.6 0.2 — -1.0 — — -0.4 0.5 ** — -0.2
Price Volatility — — 1.3 *** 1.7 *** — 1.9 *** — — 0.6 *** 0.7 *** — 0.8 ***
Dev. Expl.(%)∗ 25.0 22.9 46.2 61.1 54.2 67.9 8.2 18.0 24.1 29.7 27.3 37.5
Success Rate† 93.6 92.5 95.7 97.1 95.5 97.8 95.6 95.7 96.1 95.7 95.2 95.2
Accuracy‡ 50.0 66.7 85.7 83.3 85.7 90.9 0.0 100 75.0 60.0 66.7 50.0
Sensibility§ 14.3 18.2 42.8 71.4 54.5 76.9 0.0 18.2 21.4 21.4 18.2 23.1
Notes: Maximum likelihood estimates of equation (2). Symbols ∗,∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance of a parameter at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
∆OR is the change in the odds ratio resulting from a one-unit change in STT .
∗ “Deviance Explained” Goodness of Fit Criterion.
† Fraction of events (No Crisis or Crisis) correctly predicted by the model.
‡ Fraction crisis predictions that were realized.
§ Fraction of realized crises correctly predicted by the model.
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Table 5 – Estimation Results: Alternative Measure of Financial Crisis
Sample 1 Sample 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Transactions Costs
STT Index 0.4 0.4 0.4 ** 1.1 ** 0.2 0.7 0.1 1.1 0.0 0.1 0.8 1.0 *
∆OR 1.5 1.5 1.5 3.0 1.2 2.0 1.1 3.0 1.0 1.1 2.2 2.7
Macroeconomic Variables
GDP Growth -2.0 *** — — -3.7 ** -3.3 ** -4.6 ** -0.6 ** — — -0.6 -0.7 * -0.5
Inflation -6.8 — — 11.2 19.3 16.6 -0.7 — — 0.1 5.3 3.8
Real Interest Rate 0.5 — — 35.5 * 17.3 * 48.6 * 5.7 ** — — 10.4 ** 9.3 ** 9.8 **
Banking Variables
Private Credit — 0.7 — — 0.6 0.7 — 0.4 — — 0.4 0.3
Total deposits — 0.5 — — — — — 1.2 — — 0.8 —
Liquid Assets — -0.2 — — 0.7 — — -1.1 — — -0.6 0.7 *
Net Interest — -0.1 — — 0.0 — — 0.2 — — -0.4 —
Bank Costs — 0.9 ** — — 1.2 * 0.6 — 0.6 *** — — 0.5 *** —
Stock Markets
Capitalization — — -0.5 1.6 * — 0.6 — — -0.4 0.4 — -0.6
Value Traded — — 0.6 — — 1.1 — — 0.7 — — 1.1
Stock Turnover — — -0.3 1.2 * — — — — -0.4 0.4 — -0.6
Price Volatility — — 1.2 *** 3.0 *** — 3.0 * — — 0.5 *** 0.6 *** — 0.7 ***
Dev. Expl. (%)∗ 27.9 29.0 41.5 74.6 57.3 75.5 9.7 17.3 16.0 25.3 26.6 36.8
Success Rate† 95.2 94.7 96.1 97.2 95.9 96.9 95.8 95.7 95.4 95.4 94.7 95.6
Accuracy‡ 75.0 100 83.3 87.5 83.3 85.7 0.0 100 50.0 50.0 50.0 60.0
Sensibility§ 27.3 25.0 45.5 63.6 55.6 66.7 0.0 18.2 14.3 14.3 18.2 23.1
Notes: Maximum likelihood estimates of equation (2). Symbols ∗,∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance of a parameter at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
∆OR is the change in the odds ratio resulting from a one-unit change in STT .
∗ “Deviance Explained” Goodness of Fit Criterion.
† Fraction of events (No Crisis or Crisis) correctly predicted by the model.
‡ Fraction crisis predictions that were realized.
§ Fraction of realized crises correctly predicted by the model.
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